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Abstract 
This paper tests the empirical predictions of recent theories of the endogenous entry of
bidders in auctions.  Data come from a field experiment, involving  sealed-bid auctions for
collectible trading cards over the Internet.  Manipulating the reserve prices in the auctions as
an experimental treatment variable generates several results.   First, observed participation
behavior indicates that bidders consider their bid submission to be costly, and that bidder
participation is indeed an endogenous decision.  Second, the participation is more consistent
with a  mixed-strategy entry equilibrium than with a  deterministic equilibrium.  Third, the
data  reject the prediction that the profit- maximizing reserve price is greater than or equal to
the auctioneer’s salvage value for the good, showing instead that a zero reserve price
provides higher expected profits in this case.
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1  Introduction
The earliest theoretical models of auctions assumed a fixed number N of participating
bidders, with the number commonly known to the auctioneer and the participating bidders.  More
recent  models  have  relaxed  this  assumption,  considering  the  possibility  of  costly  bidder
participation, so that the actual number of participating bidders is an endogenous variable in the
model.  In this paper, I use a field experiment, auctioning several hundred collectible trading
cards in an existing market on the Internet, to test the assumptions and the predictions of models
of auctions with endogenous entry.
I concentrate on three empirical questions in this paper.  First, can an experiment turn up evi-
dence of endogenous entry behavior in a real-world market?  The answer to this question appears
to be yes.  Second, given the existence of endogenous entry, does the entry equilibrium appear to
be better modeled as stochastic, or as deterministic?  Evidence from the experiment indicates that
the stochastic equilibrium concept is a better model of behavior.  Third, is it possible to verify
the theory of McAfee, Quan, and Vincent (1998, henceforth, MQV), that even with endogenous
bidder entry, the optimal reserve price for the auctioneer to set is at least as great as the
auctioneer’s salvage value?   The answer to this question is “no,” as a reserve price of zero
appears to provide higher expected profits than a reserve price at the auctioneer’s salvage value.
The  field-experiment  methodology  of  this  study,  that  of  auctioning  real  goods  in  a
preexisting  market,  represents  a  hybrid  between  traditional  laboratory  experiments  and
traditional field research which takes the data as given.  It shares with laboratory experiments the
important advantage of allowing the researcher to control certain variables of interest, rather than
leaving the researcher subject to the vagaries of the actual marketplace.  (The key experimental
treatment in this paper is the manipulation of the reserve price across auctions, to observe how3
participants react in their entry and bidding decisions.)  It shares with traditional field research
the advantage of studying agents’ behavior in a real-world environment, rather than in a more
artificial laboratory setting.
Although the experimental literature on auctions is vast,
2 almost all of these studies have im-
posed an exogenous number of bidders (determined by the experimenter).  Three exceptions are
Smith and Levin (2001), Palfrey and Pevnitskaya (2003), and Cox, Dinkin, and Swarthout
(2001).  Smith and Levin (2001) and Palfrey and Pevnitskaya (2003) design their experiments to
determine whether the entry equilibrium which obtains is deterministic or stochastic, a question I
also investigate in this paper.  Cox, Dinkin, and Swarthout (2001) show that when participation
in a common-value auction is costly, winner’s-curse effects are attenuated.
In the empirical literature on auctions in the field,
3 one recent study considers endogenous
entry.  Bajari and Hortacsu (2003) note that in eBay auctions for coin proof sets, the number of
observed bidders is positively correlated with the book value of the item and negatively
correlated with the minimum bid for the item. From this they infer that bidding is costly, and
they therefore provide a structural econometric model of bidding that includes an endogenous
entry decision.   The present paper adds to the empirical and experimental literatures on the
endogenous entry of bidders by conducting a controlled experiment to gather evidence on the
type of endogenous entry found in a real-world market.
The paper is organized as follows.   The next section  describes the relevant aspects of endog-
enous-entry auction theory, focusing on the testable implications.  The third section describes the
marketplace where the experiment took place.   The following twin subsections explain the
respective designs of the two sets of experiments.  The fifth section presents the results, and a
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sixth section concludes.
2  Theoretical Background
Recently, there have been a number of important extensions to Vickrey’s (1961) original
model of auctions with a fixed, known number of bidders.  The earliest examples of endogenous-
entry bidding models include Samuelson (1985), Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1987), and McAfee and
McMillan (1987).  In these models, bidders have some cost to participating (either the research
required to learn one’s value for the good, or the effort required to decide on a bid and submit it).
This cost causes some potential bidders to stay out of the auction entirely, and can cause other ef-
fects as well.   For example, Samuelson (1985) and Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1987), making
different modelling assumptions, both find that endogenous entry drives down the auctioneer’s
optimal reserve price relative to a model of costless entry.  One of the goals of the present paper
is to demonstrate the existence of entry costs in a real-world auction market.
McAfee and McMillan (1987) model bidder entry as a pure-strategy, asymmetric Nash equi-
librium.  In these models, exactly n bidders enter the auction (out of a total of N>n potential bid-
ders), and n is determined endogenously from the other parameters of the model (the auction for-
mat, the degree of affiliation of bidder values, the cost of entry, and so on).  Alternatively, others
have modeled a mixed-strategy, symmetric entry equilibrium (Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1987),
Levin and Smith (1994), MQV (1998)).  In the mixed-strategy models, bidders each enter with
probability ρ, where ρ is determined endogenously.
4
Levin and Smith (1994) point out that the difference between pure-strategy (deterministic)
                                                            
4 These models find simple, symmetric solutions by assuming that bidders decide whether to participate be-
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models and mixed-strategy (stochastic) ones has implications for social welfare: if entry is
stochastic, then expected social surplus is decreasing in the number N of potential bidders.  The
reason is that the variance of the number n of actual entrants is increasing in N, and such
variance is costly.  In common-value auctions, then, it turns out that auctioneers can increase
both social welfare and their own profits by using reserve prices to discourage entry.
In a separate paper, Smith and Levin (2001) perform an experiment in which they attempt to
determine whether entry by bidders is stochastic or deterministic: they find evidence in favor of
their stochastic hypothesis.  However, the experimental procedure doesn’t actually involve any
auctions; rather, it assigns simulated auction payoffs by a lottery procedure.
5 Palfrey and
Pevnitskaya (2003) modify this experimental design to conduct a first-price sealed-bid auction
after the entry decision.  They observe that the same bidders tend to enter repeated auctions,
indicating a pure- rather than mixed-strategy equlibrium.   Pevnitskaya (2004) provides a
theoretical model of heterogenously risk-averse bidders to explain this observation.  When some
bidders are more risk-averse than others, and all bidders know this fact,the more risk-averse
bidders stay out of the auction deterministically in order to collect a fixed payoff.  Only the
relatively less risk-averse bidders enter the auction, also deterministically.
6 mixed-strategy
equilibrium disappears in favor of a pure-strategy equilibrium  the more risk-averse bidders stay
out of the auction in favor of a fixed payoff, while relatively less risk-averse bidders enter the
auction.  In this paper, I attempt to provide evidence on the question of stochastic versus de-
terministic entry equilibria in a field environment.
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MQV (1998) examine the effects of reserve prices where valuations are where bidder entry is
endogenous and bidder valuations may be either affiliated.   In their model, the auctioneer
chooses a reserve price and announces her auction, together with the level of her reserve price, to
N potential bidders.  Bidders then decide whether or not to incur the participation costs, making a
stochastic (mixed-strategy) entry decision.   Next the participating bidders find out their private
information about the value of the good, they submit their bids, and finally the auctioneer awards
the good to the highest bidder.  If no bidder chooses to enter and to bid at least the reserve price,
then the auctioneer keeps the good for herself and earns some outside option utility, or “salvage
value.”  The main prediction of MQV is that the optimal reserve price is at least as high as the
salvage value of the good.  This is a testable prediction; raising the reserve price from some
lower value to the expected salvage value of the good should raise revenues for the auctioneer.
To summarize, this paper will attempt to answer three main questions.  First, are entry costs
relevant in the Internet auction market where I ran my experiments?  Second, is the entry equilib-
rium a deterministic or a stochastic one?  Third, is the optimal reserve price at least as high as the
auctioneer’s salvage value?  Note that the first question is about an assumption of endogenous-
entry, the second attempts to distinguish between two rival theories, and the third is a test of the
empirical prediction of a specific model.
3  Experimental Design
For this experiment, I auctioned trading cards via first-price, sealed-bid auctions, varying the
reserve prices across treatments.   The data in this paper are the same as in Lucking-Reiley
(1999).  The experiments took place in 1995 in a pre-eBay online market for collectible cards
from Magic: the Gathering, a game which has enjoyed great success since its launch in August
1993.  In the game, players assume the roles of dueling wizards, each with their own libraries of7
magic spells (represented by decks of cards) that may potentially be used against opponents.
Cards are sold in random assortments, just like baseball cards, at retail stores ranging from small
game and hobby shops to large chain retailers.  The games’s maker, Wizards of the Coast (now a
division of Hasbro) has developed and printed thousands of distinct card types, each of which
plays a slightly different role in the game.
As discussed in Lucking-Reiley (1999), soon after the introduction of Magic, players and
collectors interested in buying, selling, and trading game cards began to use the Internet to find
each other and carry out transactions. In a Usenet newsgroup dedicated to this purpose, traders
used a variety of trading institutions, including negotiated trades of one card for another, sales at
posted prices, and auctions of various formats, typically lasting multiple days.
Scarcity was one major determinant of transaction prices for cards, as some cards were
printed in relatively low quantities, and some cards had gone out of print.  The most common in-
print cards were not worth trading over the Internet; their values were pennies or less.  Cards
designated “uncommon” but not “rare” traded for prices of ten cents to two dollars.   Cards
designated “rare” but still in print typically ranged in price from one to fifteen dollars.  Out-of-
print cards, depending on their initial scarcity and on other attributes, traded for as much as three
hundred dollars.  In this research project, I dealt only in out-of-print cards.
In addition to data generated in my own auctions, I also make use of contemporaneous
market data from the weekly Cloister price list in this marketplace.   Cloister was a card trader
who wrote a computer program that automatically searched the marketplace newsgroup for each
instance of each card name (with some tolerance for misspellings) and gathered data on the
prices posted next to each card name in the newsgroup messages.  It then computed statistics for
each card, and automatically archived these data on the Internet as a public service for other8
interested traders..  Each card’s reported list price is a trimmed mean over hundreds or thousands
of different observations on the newsgroup. Despite some problems with these data, discussed in
Lucking-Reiley (1999) many card traders adopted the Cloister price list as a standard measure of
card market value, so I adopt it as a useful measure in my own analysis.
This marketplace represented an exciting opportunity to run auction field experiments.  For
the experiments, I purchased several thousand dollars’ worth of cards (also via the Internet), and
auctioned them off while systematically manipulating the reserve prices in order to observe their
effects on bidder participation and bidding behavior.  Because in any given week there were
dozens of auctioneers holding Magic auctions on the Internet, as an experimenter I was able to
be a “small player” who did not significantly perturb the overall market.
I employed two distinct experimental designs to collect the data.  The first design examines
the effects of a binary variable: whether or not minimum bids were used.  By auctioning the
same cards twice, once with and once without minimum bids, it exploits within-card variation to
find the effects of the treatment variable on bidding and entry behavior.   The second design
investigates the effects of a continuous variable: the reserve price level (expressed as a fraction
of the Cloister reference price).  The between-card variation provides information that can be
used to test the MQV prediction about the optimal reserve price level.
4.1  Within-Card Experiments
The first part of the data collection consisted of two pairs of auctions.   Each of the four
auctions was a sealed-bid, first-price auction of several dozen Magic cards auctioned off individ-
ually.  This simultaneous auction of many different goods at once, although not  common in9
other economic environments,
7 is the norm for auctions of Magic cards on the Internet.  Running
auctions in this simultaneous-auction format thus made the experiment as realistic and natural as
possible for the bidders, who see many other similar auctions in the Internet marketplace for
cards.
Each auction lasted for one week, from the time the auction was announced to the deadline
by which all bids had to be received.  I announced each auction to potential bidders via two
channels.  First, I posted three announcements to the appropriate Internet newsgroup.  For each
auction, I posted a total of three newsgroup messages spaced evenly over the course of the week
of the auction.  Second, I solicited some bidders directly via email messages to their personal
electronic mailboxes.  My mailing list for direct solicitation was comprised of people who had
already demonstrated their interest in auctions for Magic cards by participation in previous ones.
The paired-auction experiment proceeded as follows.  First, I held an absolute auction (no
minimum bid) for 86 different cards (one of each card in the Antiquities expansion set).  The
subject line of the announcement read “Reiley's Auction #4: ANTIQUITIES, 5 Cent Minimum,
Free Shipping!” so that potential bidders might be attracted by the unusually low minimum bid
per card, essentially zero. (A 5-cent minimum is effectively no minimum, since the auction rules
also required all bids to be in integer multiples of a nickel.)  After the one-week deadline for
submitting bids had passed, I computed the highest bid on each card.  To each bidder who had
won one or more cards, I mailed (electronically) a bill for the total amount owed.
8  After
                                                            
7 Although simultaneous auctions are not traditional for familiar auctions, such as those of art, estate goods,
or tulip bulbs, such formats have been used for timber and offshore oil auctions.  The advent of computerized
bidding appears to be making the simultaneous auction format even more common.   In addition to the card
auctions in this newsgroup market, simultaneous Web-based auctions are becoming common at commercial
sites such as eBay, and a simultaneous-auction format was used for the recent FCC auctions of spectrum rights
(see McMillan (1994) for details).
8 Although the standard practice in this marketplace is for auctioneers and other card sellers to charge
buyers for postage and/or handling, I chose not to do this.  I wanted bidders to bid independently, as much as
possible, on each of the cards in which they were interested.  Someone seriously interested in one card might10
receiving a winner’s payment via check or money order, I mailed them their cards.  Almost no
one defaulted on their winning bids.
9
I also mailed a list of the winning bids to each bidder who had participated in the auction,
whether or not they had won cards.  This represented an effort to maintain my reputation as a
credible auctioneer, demonstrating my truthfulness to those who had participated.   I did not,
however, give the bidders any explicit information about the number of people who had
participated in the auction, or about the number of people who had received email invitations to
participate.
After one additional week of buffer time after the end of the first auction, I ran the second
auction in the paired experiment, this time with reasonably high minimum bid levels on each of
the same 86 cards as before.   The minimum bid levels were determined by consulting the
standard (trimmed-mean) Cloister price list of Magic cards cited in section 3 of this paper, and
setting the minimum bid level for each card equal to 90% of the value of that card from the price
list.
This contrast in minimum bid levels (zero versus 90% of the Cloister price list) was the only
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
decide to bid higher on a second card in the same auction than they would if the cards were auctioned
independently, because they would like to spread out the postage costs per card by purchasing more than one
card simultaneously from the same source.  In addition, some of the cards I auctioned had rather low values, and
I wanted to avoid having the card values be swamped by the cost of shipping.  For example, if a bidder won a
single card for 20 cents and then had to pay a fixed 50-cent shipping charge on top of that, the amount of useful
information which could be derived from her bid would be rather suspect.  Therefore, in the interests of keeping
bid data as clean as possible, I decided to pay postage costs myself, and announced in advance that first-class
shipping was included in the amount of each bid.
9 A small number of winning bidders failed to pay for the cards they had won.  In all, I received payment
for 90% of the cards sold, constituting 89% of the reported revenue in the within-card auctions.  Almost all of
the “deadbeat” bidders were those who won only a single card, and who explained that they had originally
hoped to win more cards, and didn’t feel it was worth it to complete the transaction.   I discouraged such
behavior, but was unable to eliminate it.  Only one or two individuals won multiple cards but failed to pay for
them.  Since none of the unpaid cards seemed to have outlandishly high winning bid amounts, I have taken the
point of view that all bids were made in good faith, and have not excluded any observations from my analysis.11
economically significant difference between the two auctions.
10  By keeping all other conditions
identical between the two auctions, I attempted to isolate the effects of minimum bids on
potential bidders' behavior.  One condition that could not be kept identical, unfortunately, was
the time period during which the auction took place.  Because the two auctions took place two
weeks apart, there were potential differences between the auctions that might have affected
bidder behavior.  First, the demands for the cards (or the supplies by other auctioneers) might
have changed systematically over time, which is a realistic possibility in such a fast-changing
market as this one.
11  Second, since the auctions shared many of the same bidders, the results of
the first auction may have affected the demand for the cards sold in the second auction.
12
To control for such potential variations in conditions over time, I simultaneously ran the
same experiment in reverse order, using a different sample of cards.  This second pair of auctions
each featured the 78 cards in the Arabian Nights expansion set, with minimum bids present in the
first auction but absent in the second.  Just as before, minimum bids were set at ninety percent of
the market price level from the Cloister price list.  The first auction in this pair began three days
after the start of the first auction in the previous pair, so that the auctions in the two experiments
overlapped in time but were offset by three days.  Also, I used a larger mailing list for my email
announcement in this pair of auctions (232 people) than I had for the previous pair of auctions
                                                            
10 Both auctions lasted exactly seven days.  The same 86 cards were up for bid in each auction.  Each
auction announcement was posted exactly three times to the marketplace newsgroup, and was emailed to
primarily the same list of potential bidders.  Even the subject line of the announcements and mailings was kept
identical, except that in the second auction, the words “5 Cent Minimum” were removed.
11 For example, certain cards from the Arabian Nights expansion set increased in value by a factor of ten
during their first year out of print.  It turns out that market prices for cards were actually rather stable during the
month in which this experiment was conducted, but I did not know a priori what was going to happen to card
prices.
12 For example, suppose that a particular bidder is anxious to obtain a single Guardian Beast card for her
deck, so that her valuation of the card is higher than that of any of the other bidders in the experiment.  She may
win the card in the first auction, and then have zero demand for that same card in the second auction.  If this is
generally the case for most cards, that the highest-value bidders in the sample are screened out in the first
auction, then we might expect to see systematically lower revenues in the second auction.12
(50 people), with the first mailing list being a subset of the second mailing list.  Otherwise, all
other  conditions  were  identical  between  the  two  pairs  of  auctions.   A  sample  auction
announcement, as it appeared to the potential bidders both in electronic mail and in the
marketplace newsgroup, is displayed in the Appendix.
Table 1 shows a set of summary statistics for each of the four auctions in the within-card ex-
periments.
13  The auctions are displayed in two pairs: first Auctions AA and AR, for the 86
Antiquities cards, and then Auctions BA and BR, for the 78 Arabian Nights cards.
14  Auctions
AA and BA were with no minimum bids, while Auctions AR and BR had sizable minimums
(equal to 90% of the market price).
The table contains quite a bit of descriptive information about the auctions, including the
number of participating bidders, the number of bids received, and the total payments received
from winning bidders.  Note two key points.  First, “real money” was involved in the auction
transactions.  Of the 73 different bills I sent to winning bidders over the course of the experi-
ment, the median payment amount for each auction was between $10 and $24.  A few individual
payments even exceeded $100.
Second, in each auction there are multiple winners.  The number of winners in each auction
ranges from 6 to 27, and the fraction of bidders who win at least one card is between 40 percent
                                                            
13 A note on mnemonics.  The first letter represents the card set: A for Antiquities, B for Ara bian Nights.
The second letter is A for an absolute auction (reserve prices equal to zero), and R for an auction with positive
reserve prices.
These auctions were part of a series of auctions run for a larger research program, so participating bidders
saw me run several other auctions (not part of the research presented here) during the same time period.  This
had two advantages where the experimental design is concerned.   First, it helped avoid drawing bidders’
attention to the point of my research.   (For example, during this period I also ran an English auction and a
second-price auction and another first-price auction, with different sets of cards.)  I feared that if they knew I
was looking for the effects of reserve prices, it might distort their behavior (for example, they might consciously
try to bid consistently from one auction to another).  Second, it had the effect of making bidders unsure of what
I would do next.  In particular, I didn’t want bidders to expect that I would always auction the same card twice,
for it might distort their behavior if they knew they would have a second chance to bid on the same card.
14 A few of the auction items I denote as “cards” were actually groups of cards: either a sealed packet of
out-of-print cards, or a set of common cards bundled together.13
and 86 percent.  In each auction, the median number of cards won by each winner is between 2
and 3.5, while the maximum number of cards won by a single bidder ranges from 12 to 26.
Except in Auction AR, no winner won more than 29 percent of the cards sold in any single
auction.   (In Auction AR, participation was very low: only 7 people submitted bids, 6 of whom
won at least one card, and 39 of the cards went unsold.)   The biggest spender in any of the
auctions won cards totalling $316.50 of the total revenue of $774.75 in Auction BA, generating
41 percent of the revenue despite winning no more than 15 percent of the cards_evidently, she
was particularly interested in high-value cards.  Thus, it is not the case that some people are the
highest bidders on all cards in an auction, which suggests that a given bidder’s valuations for
different cards are at least somewhat independent.  This gives some justification for reporting
regression results in which each individual card bid is assumed to be an independent observation.14
4.2  Between-Card Experiments
A second set of experiments was designed to examine the effects of changes in the level of
the reserve price, rather than merely changes in the existence of reserve prices.  Five first-price,
sealed-bid auctions took place, each with a one-week timeframe for the submission of bids.
Each was a simultaneous auction of many different items, this time with no overlap of items
between auctions.  Each card in the first four auctions (R1 through R4) had a posted reserve
price.  The fifth auction (R0) used a zero reserve price on every card, in order to provide a basis
for comparison.
15  Just as before, I announced each auction via three posts to the relevant
newsgroup, as well as via email to a list of bidders.
16
In the first four auctions, I auctioned 99 different cards each time, setting a reserve price for
each card as a particular fraction of the current Cloister price of that card.  In each of the first two
auctions, nine cards were auctioned at a minimum bid of 10 percent of the Cloister price, nine at
20 percent, nine at 30 percent, and so on, up to a maximum of 110 percent of the Cloister price.
For each reserve-price level, I chose an assortment of different cards with widely different
Cloister prices, and scattered the group randomly across the complete list of cards.  After an
analysis of the data from those auctions, I chose to collect more data both at very low and at very
high reserve price levels.  Therefore, the third and fourth auctions were designed to have equal
numbers of cards auctioned at reserve levels of 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 100, 110, 120, 130, 140, and
150 percent of the Cloister price.
17
                                                            
15 It was necessary to do another absolute auction, rather than just reusing those of the previous section, be-
cause those took place in a substantially different time period, with a very different number of invited bidders,
thus making their results incomparable to those of the within-card experiments.
16 For this series of auctions, the bidder pool was quite a bit larger than before.  531 individuals were
emailed to participate in Auction R1, and as some people specifically requested to be removed from my auction
announcement mailing list, the list dropped to 489 individuals by the time Auction R4 began.
17 In practice, the number of cards at each reserve-price level ended up not being precisely equal.  Because I
required bids to be in multiples of $0.05, I always took the computed reserve price and rounded it down to the
nearest acceptable bid amount.  In the analysis below, I take the ratio of the actual reserve price used to the15
This variation in reserve price levels was designed to investigate how both bidder behavior
and expected auction revenue would react to changes in the reserve price, and to calculate the
optimal reserve price level.  Normalizing by the Cloister price, since this is a standard reference
price computed in the same way for all Magic cards, makes cross-card comparisons feasible.
Besides the exceptions noted above, all experimental protocols and bidder instructions were kept
identical to those used in the auctions with reserve prices in the experimental design described in
section 4.1.
Summary statistics for the between-card auctions are given in Table 3.  In auctions R1 to R4,
reserve prices ranged from 0% to 150% of each individual card’s Cloister value, and the average
reserve price level varied slightly from auction to auction, from 60% to 85%.  In auction R0, of
course, the average reserve price level was zero.
As can be seen in the table, each auction had dozens of bidders and hundreds of bids on indi-
vidual cards.  The number of people receiving email invitations to participate declined with each
successive auction, but only due to recipients asking to be removed from my mailing list, so the
changes in the mailing list should not have affected the number of potential participants.  Note
that the data from the between-card auctions is not directly comparable to that from the within-
card auctions, because the size and composition of the pool of participating bidders  changed
considerably during the intervening six months.  Very few bidders overlapped between the two
experiments; most of the bidders in the between-card experiment were new recruits.
The table also displays aggregate statistics on revenue, including the total Cloister value of
all the cards in each auction, the total revenue earned on cards which were sold, and a grand-
total revenue figure which also includes the salvage value of the unsold cards.   The auction
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Cloister price, and round to the nearest 10% level in order to examine the effects of the reserve price on
expected revenue.  This results in unequal numbers of cards at the different levels of reserve prices.16
revenue in each case was reasonably close to the total Cloister value of the cards; in Auction R2 I
earned revenue greater than the total Cloister value, while in the three others I earned slightly
less.
5  Results
I now present the results from the experiment, separately for each of the three empirical ques-
tions  outlined  above.   Are  entry  costs  relevant?   Is  the  entry  equilibrium  stochastic  or
deterministic?  Do the auctioneer’s profits improve as he raises the reserve price to be at least as
high as his salvage value?17
5.1    Entry costs are relevant
The within-card experiments demonstrate that endogenous bidder entry appears to be
the right model for this market.  Statistics on the number of card bids per participating
bidder are shown in Table 2.  As expected, individual bidders tend to submit fewer bids
in the presence of minimums than they do in the absence of minimums.  This does not in
itself demonstrate the existence of bidding costs; a bidder who contemplates how much to
bid and then decides that the reserve price exceeds his maximum willingness could still
be counted as having “participated,” because the decision cost would already have been
incurred even though the reserve price prevents me from observing a low bid.  In the
auctions with minimums, no single bidder submitted bids on even half of the cards; the
maximum number of bids by a single bidder was 30.  By contrast, there were bidders in
both of the no-minimum auctions who submitted individual bids on every single card.
Interestingly, relatively few bidders followed this strategy of bidding on every single
card in the absolute (no-minimum) auctions.  Only one out of 19 bidders bid on every
single item in Auction AA, and only six of 62 bidders bid on every single item in Auction
BA.  These statistics indicate that the cost of submitting a bid (the participation cost) is
high  enough  to  affect  bidder  behavior, and thus this experimental environment is
appropriate for exploring endogenous-entry bidding models such as MQV.  If there were
no cost to submitting a bid, then one would expect to see all of the participating bidders
submitting bids on every card (as low as a nickel, say), since every card does have some
positive resale value even to people who get no consumption utility from it.
18  I conclude
                                                            
18 Because of the time and transaction costs involved in selling it off, it is conceivable that for
some bidders, the net resale value of a card might be less than five cents.  However, most cards had
gross resale values of over a dollar, and many bidders in this market could be assumed to take some
pleasure in trading cards with others, as trading is a big part of the game culture.18
that bidders deem the probability of getting a bargain (and thus a resale profit) on such a
card is low enough that the expected profit from bidding does not always outweigh the
cost of having to decide on a bid amount and to type the approximately ten characters
required to submit another card bid.  Indeed, the median number of card bids submitted
by a single bidder was only 13 (of a possible 87) in Auction AA, and 14 (of a possible
78) in Auction BA, even though these auctions had no minimum bids.
Thus, bidders do appear to make a participation decision consistent with the existence
of small entry costs; the number of participating bidders in each auction is not exogenous.
The classical theory makes some accurate predictions about the effects of reserve prices,
as shown earlier, despite this violation of its assumptions.
5.2    Is the entry equilibrium stochastic or deterministic?
Given  the  existence  of  endogenous  entry,  I  now  ask:  is  the  entry  equilibrium
deterministic or stochastic?  Very few bidders bid on a card both times it was offered,
despite the fact that the same people were invited each time.  Nineteen and seven bidders,
respectively, bid in the two Antiquities auctions, but only 4 people overlapped between
the two auctions.  In the Arabian Nights auctions, there were 42 and 62 bidders, but only
17 of the bidders overlapped between the two.  Thus, in each pair of auctions, there were
a proportionally large number people who entered the first auction but not the second,
and other people who entered the second auction but not the first.  This argues in favor of
a stochastic equilibrium, as the most natural kind of deterministic equilibrium is one in
which the same bidders enter each time.
Two objections might be raised to the result just presented.  First, it might be the case
that people enter one auction but not the other because the latter auction has reserve19
prices which are higher than they are willing to pay.   However, this screening-out
explanation cannot account for the bidders who bid in the presence of reserve prices but
fail to bid in the absence of reserve prices; there were 3 such bidders in the Antiquities
auctions, and 25 such bidders in the Arabian Nights auctions.   The second potential
objection is that bidders may have bid in the chronologically first auction, but not the
second, in a pair because they had already bought the cards by the time the second
auction occurred.  This complaint potentially affects the 25 Arabian Nights bidders just
cited, who bid in Auction BR but not in Auction BA.  Indeed, three of these bidders each
placed a bid on a single card in Auction BR and won it, so there would be no reason to
expect them to bid in the second auction.  However, none of the remaining 22 bidders
won all the cards they bid on in Auction BR: ten did not win any cards at all, while the
remaining twelve won an average of 50 percent of the cards they bid on.   It is still
possible that these bidders managed to purchase the rest of the cards they were interested
in from someone else during the week that passed between my two auctions, but I can at
least say that they did not buy them from me.  Thus, the evidence is fairly strong that
bidders in these auctions made stochastic entry decisions: faced with the same auction
opportunity, the same person might sometimes enter and sometimes fail to enter.  This
contrasts with the laboratory findings of Palfrey and Pevnitskaya (2003), who find .
The stochastic entry decision might not be due to conscious randomization by an
bidder trying to follow a “mixed strategy” in the textbook sense.  Perhaps bidders enter
“randomly” because of other things happening in their lives: a college student had too
much homework one week, or a computer programmer had a family emergency.  Lots of
random events could cause bidders to show up to one auction but not another.  However,20
in terms of auction design and welfare considerations, what matters is whether the entry
decisions in a real-world auction are deterministically predictable by the auctioneer and
by the rival bidders.   My evidence shows that   at least in this market, bidder entry
decisions are stochastic, so the model of Levin and Smith (1994) has empirical relevance.
5.3    Optimal Reserve Price with Endogenous Entry
Recall that the main prediction of the MQV paper is that raising the reserve price
from some low value to the salvage value of the good will increase expected auction
profits, even in an endogenous-entry context.  In order to understand the effect of the
reserve price on expected revenues, I turn to the between-card experimental data.  Recall
that these data provide samples of auction revenues at differing reserve price levels
(normalized by Cloister price for each card).
Table 4 summarizes the results of the experiment separately for each reserve-price
decile, from reserve prices of 0% of the Cloister price to reserve prices of 150% of the
Cloister price.  The table displays the total number of cards I auctioned at each reserve
price, the number of those which went unsold, and the mean and standard deviation of the
revenues at each reserve price level.  The revenues are also normalized by the Cloister
price of each card, and an unsold card counts as an observation of zero revenue.  The data
are displayed graphically in Figure 1, with the mean revenues plotted against the reserve
prices.  The error bars show one standard error in each direction (where the standard error
equals the standard deviation in revenues for that reserve price level divided by the
square root of the number of observations at that reserve price level).  We see that the
revenues are quite high at a reserve price of zero, then drop off sharply at a reserve price
of 10% of Cloister price.   Revenues seem to rise again, generally, between 50% and21
100% of the Cloister price, then fall again at higher reserve price levels.   There are
surprisingly high revenues observed at 140% to 150% of the Cloister price, albeit with
high standard errors.
To test the MQV prediction also requires an estimate of the salvage value for the
unsold cards.  I asked my local card dealer what he would pay me for my unsold cards;
he responded with an offer that was 20 percent of their Cloister price.   He further
indicated that 20% of Cloister price would be his average offer price for cards of this
quality and quantity, so I adopt a salvage value of 20% percent of the Cloister price for
each card.
19
Now the question is whether a reserve price equal to the salvage value yields
expected profits at least as high as a reserve price less than the salvage value (0% or
10%) of salvage value.   The point estimates of revenues certainly indicate that the
opposite is the case.   In order to perform a formal hypothesis test, first I calculate
expected profits rather than expected revenues.  For the 0% reserve price, all cards sold,
so profits remain the same as revenues: 1.192.  For the 20% reserve price, two cards went
unsold; when I count salvage profits of 20% of Cloister price for each of these cards, the
estimate of expected profit rises slightly, from 0.857 to 0.870.  Using the calculated stan-
dard deviations, I conduct a test of the null hypothesis of equality between expected
profits at 0% reserve price and expected profits at 20% reserve price.   The resulting
standard normal test statistic is 2.18, with a p-value of 0.029.   Thus, I reject the null
hypothesis of equality at the 5% level of significance, and conclude that expected profits
are actually higher for a zero reserve price than they are for a reserve price equal to the
                                                            
19 I might have been able to shop around for a better price with a different card dealer, but this
represents my best estimate of a salvage value, which by definition should be net of all administrative
costs, including search costs.22
salvage value.
20
This is a violation of the theoretical prediction, an example of a case in which the
auctioneer does better to hold an auction with a zero reserve price than to set the reserve
price equal to the salvage value.  One possible explanation is that an auction with no
reserve  price  generates  more  enthusiasm  among  bidders,  causing  higher  levels  of
participation.  In other words, modest minimum bids may eliminate some high valuation-
bidders, who would have bid high if they had participated, but decide not to participate
unless their attention is attracted by an auction with zero minimum bids.  Although a few
items may end up being sold at very low prices, they might serve as “loss leaders,”
similar  to  the  goods  advertised  at  deep  discounts  by  supermarkets,  enabling  the
auctioneer to collect higher revenues overall. This proposed effect involves increased
entry  through  attracting  bidders’  attention,with the absolute auction as a type of
promotion, rather than assuming the bidders will make a careful calculation of the costs
versus the benefits of bidding.    Note in Table 4 that the total number of bidders in
Auction R0 is actually lower than in the other auctions, which might seem to be evidence
against this effect, although I should also note that the number of cards in auction R0 is
also lower than in the auctions with reserve prices.  One caveat about this finding is that
most of the zero-reserve-price cards were sold in the same auction (R0).  Although I did
attempt to keep all other variables constant across auctions, the anomaly might be due to
some uncontrolled factor which was different between R0 and the earlier auctions.
                                                            
20 The reader might wonder about robustness to alternative assumptions about the salvage value.
In particular is possible that I may have overstated auction profits, because my revenue figures are not
discounted for the labor and postage I spent in order to ship the cards to the winning bidders, and
therefore non-auction salvage might actually be more attractive, relative to auction revenues, than I
initially assumed.  Assuming salvage values of 30%, 40%, or even 50% of Cloister price still yields
statistically significantly higher profits for a zero reserve price than for a reserve price equal to salvage
value, so the result is quite robust.  (The difference is no longer statistically significant for assumed
salvage values of 60% or higher, as there are fewer observations at these higher reserve price levels.)23
 6  Conclusions
This study presents the results of controlled experimental auctions performed in a
field environment.  By auctioning real goods in a preexisting, natural auction market, I
have obtained data in a manner that is intermediate between laboratory experiments and
traditional studies of field data.  Some variables were unfortunately unobservable and
uncontrolled_for example, I could not assign “valuations” for each good to each bidder,
as a laboratory experimentalist might.  On the other hand, I have the opportunity to hold
constant most of the relevant variables in the environment, and to manipulate the
treatment variable, which in this case was the existence and level of reserve prices.  By
giving up the ability to observe and manipulate some of variables that laboratory
experimenters can control, I gained a realistic environment.   The participants had
previous experience bidding for the types of real goods I auctioned, and the auctions took
place in an Internet- based market where bidder entry decisions seemed potentially
important.
The first result is that entry costs are an important feature of this real-world auction
markets, thus confirming the central assumption of endogenous-entry auction theory.
The costs in the Magic-card market are probably not nearly as dramatic as those
postulated in other markets (for example, in the market for offshore oil rights the bidders
typically hire geologists to perform extensive analysis of the potential for oil in a given
tract).  Here, the cost of acquiring information about individual cards is quite small, but
even the cost of typing in a bid amount appears to have observable effects.
Second, when the same cards were auctioned twice in rapid succession, very different
sets of people decided to submit bids, despite the fact that the same superset of people24
were invited to participate both times.  This can be interpreted as evidence in favor of the
stochastic (mixed strategy) entry equilibrium model, where the number of participating
bidders varies unpredictably.
Third, I found that, contrary to the theory of McAfee, Quan, and Vincent (1998), a
zero reserve price can earn higher expected profits than a reserve price equal to the
auctioneer’s salvage value.  Perhaps an absolute auction attracts significantly more bidder
attention than an auction with even modest reserve prices, causing more additional entry
than might be suggested by a model of rationally calculated bidder entry decisions.  It
will be interesting to see whether this finding can be replicated in other auction markets.25
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Table 1: Summary statistics for within-card experiments.
Auction AA Auction AR Auction BA Auction BR
Minimum bids? No Yes No Yes
Card set Antiquities Antiquities Arabian Nights Arabian Nights
Start date Fri, 24 Feb Fri, 10 Mar Tue, 14 Mar Tue, 28 Feb
End date Fri, 3 Mar Fri, 17 Mar Tue, 21 Mar Tue, 7 Mar
Number of items for auction 86 86 78 78
Number of items sold 86 47 78 74
Revenue from twice-sold cards $189.90 $234.75 $758.25 $783.80
Total auction revenue $292.40 $234.75 $774.75 $783.80
Total number of bids 565 71 1583 238
Total number of bidders 19 7 62 42
  from email invitations 12 5 46 35
  from newsgroup announcements 7 2 18 7
Number of email invitations sent 52 50 232 234
Number of winners 15 6 25 27
Winner/bidder ratio 78.9% 85.7% 40.3% 64.3%
Cards per winner:
  Max 25 26 12 18
    as share of total 29.1% 55.3% 15.4% 24.3%
  Min 1 1 1 1
  Mean 5.7 7.8 3.1 2.7
  Median 3 3.5 2 2
Payment per winner:
  Max $70.00 $129.40 $316.50 $128.00
    as share of total 23.9% 55.1% 40.9% 16.3%
  Min $3.00 $0.70 $1.05 $2.55
  Mean $19.49 $39.13 $30.99 $29.03
  Median $10.50 $23.68 $13.15 $13.0029
Table 2: Bids received in the within-card auctions.
Auction AA Auction AR Auction BA Auction BR
Minimum bids? No Yes No Yes
Card set Antiquities Antiquities Arabian Nights Arabian Nights
Number of bidders 19 7 62 42
Number of items for auction 86 86 78 78
Number of bids per bidder:
  Mean 29.7 10.1 25.5 5.7
  Median 13.0 4.0 14.0 4.0
  Max 86.0 29.0 78.0 30.0
  Min 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Table 3: Summary statistics for the between-card experiments.
Auction R1 Auction R2 Auction R3 Auction R4 Auction R0
Card set Artifacts Black White Blue Red/Green
Start date Tue, 3 Oct Fri, 6 Oct Fri, 20 Oct Mon, 23 Oct Tue, 31 Oct
End date Tue, 10 Oct Fri, 13 Oct Fri, 27 Oct Mon, 30 Oct Tue, 6 Nov
Number of items for auction 99 99 99 99 86
Number of items sold 98 92 77 78 86
Mean reserve level 60% 60% 85% 81% 0%
Total number of bids 798 652 366 401 1069
Total number of bidders 57 55 46 38 42
Number of email invitations sent 532 523 512 489 472
Total Cloister value 345.83 271.55 285.87 224.89 327.05
Total auction revenue 338.45 282.65 260.95 219.25 316.70
Revenue plus salvage 343.94 283.65 269.48 224.52 316.7030
Table 4: Cards and revenues at each reserve price.
(Reserve prices and revenues normalized by the Cloister price of each card).
Reserve price Total cards Unsold cards Mean revenue Std dev of revenue
0.0 96 0 1.192 1.071
0.1 33 0 0.847 0.549
0.2 36 2 0.857 0.594
0.3 34 0 0.823 0.599
0.4 27 2 0.775 0.500
0.5 32 2 0.945 0.517
0.6 20 1 0.977 0.480
0.7 16 0 0.965 0.259
0.8 23 1 1.093 0.469
0.9 31 4 0.983 0.500
1.0 35 6 1.055 0.674
1.1 32 4 1.113 0.491
1.2 15 7 0.804 0.861
1.3 21 10 0.760 0.772
1.4 17 6 0.967 0.867
1.5 14 5 1.104 0.893